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Post-Earthquake Recovery in Haiti: The Challenges Ahead

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Nai Sema means "to connect" in the Fijian language. Through this occasional paper series, FDC aims to promote an exchange of ideas amongst those working in international development and cooperation and to generate discussion on the topics presented within.

Foreword



The improvement of emergency response and recovery strategies is a key international development priority in a world that faces the challenge of addressing large-scale disasters, particularly in poor and impoverished regions. Such events require reflection on prior practice and proactive forward planning in order to effectively address short and long term needs and unanticipated exigencies.

Knowledge sharing is a significant component of disaster risk management and FDC seeks to make a meaningful contribution to international understanding through the second edition of FDC *Nai Sema* which explores the practical issues of this critical field within the context of the recent Haiti earthquake and prior events which prompted international cooperation.

I hope that the ideas that are contained in this paper about disaster risk management issues will assist practitioners in emergency and disaster services, aid donors and providers, as well as researchers and policy makers.

Craig Wilson
Executive Director

Acknowledgements



My appointment as the new Senior Training and Disaster Risk Management Coordinator at FDC coincided with the enormously destructive earthquake which devastated the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince. This event spurred me to prepare a publication, which would both condense many of the lessons learnt from recent mega-disasters, and would also be a useful guide and aide-memoire to practitioners, both on the ground and in their support countries, as they commence what will undoubtedly be a long, complex and challenging recovery process over the months ahead.

Whilst there was no trouble researching key information sources for this publication, the relative speed in which we wanted to bring it out meant that we were somewhat limited in the time we could put aside for peer reviews. That being said I would like to acknowledge the various FDC colleagues who gave me valuable advice and support on this, namely Craig Wilson, Shawn Hunter, Vladimir Pacheco, Katrina Crawford, Sherry Chen, June Su and Katherine Green. Finally I also would like to thank Tristan Clement, the appropriate Country Program Coordinator, from the Humanitarian and Emergency Affairs Unit of World Vision Australia, who kindly agreed to review this at short notice. I especially appreciated his incisive, detailed and constructive comments.

Chris Piper
Senior Training & Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Coordinator

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Executive Summary

Whilst the overall situation on the ground in Haiti is still highly distressing with the final casualty figure still unclear it is certain that over the months ahead a clear pattern of initiatives will take place. An initial Ministers Conference, held in Montreal on 25 January 2010, will be followed by a more comprehensive International Donors Conference in New York in March once detailed preliminary damage and need assessments have taken place. The emergency response stage of the disaster is now well under way with a focus on the provision of food, emergency shelter and a range of urgent medical services for tens of thousands of affected people. It also entails search and rescue, burying the dead, the clearing of logistical routes to deliver relief supplies and a growing degree of humanitarian management, coordination and information sharing.

In the weeks and months ahead this emergency response will gradually diminish and be replaced by a complex range of complementary recovery initiatives which are developed from detailed on-the-ground assessments. These initiatives will include the development of new recovery management and coordination system ideally headed up by Haitian government authorities. Initiatives such as the continued and increasingly targeted humanitarian assistance to needy and vulnerable groups, the restoration of infrastructure services, support for community well-being and mental health, the redevelopment of sustainable livelihoods and the repair and reconstruction of homes and other buildings.

In all these initiatives lessons from the past can be learnt and applied to the situation in Haiti. This paper draws on a range of reports and evaluations from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, in particular, the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) reports and the successful Indonesian recovery programs as managed by the Indonesian Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR). This study also makes use of two illustrations; the Disaster Risk Management Cycle (DRMC) and the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) diagrams.

The major challenge still facing international stakeholders lies in their skill, ability and motivation to not take over the reins of the recovery process. Instead they should work hard to support and build up the capacity of local

communities, organisations and government departments to enable local groups to take clearer responsibility in the management of their own humanitarian initiatives. This paper also discusses some of the major challenges facing Haiti's key stakeholders that will ultimately determine the relative success or failure in the long term recovery and development of the country.

Introduction

If your intention is truly to help our people, then you must listen to them, respect them and treat them as equal partners not as passive recipients of your aid.¹

These sentiments were uttered by a prominent national leader a number of years ago on the opposite side of the globe to Haiti but they could apply equally well to the challenges facing the current Haitian leadership, as it guides its nation in the early recovery stage of its post-earthquake period. Indeed Haiti is the latest in a number of mega-disasters which have affected communities around the world over the past few years. The most researched of which is the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.

Many key emergency response and recovery initiatives will be implemented by a range of stakeholders over the coming weeks, months and years. These responses can be identified from the rich repository of learning that has come from the evaluation of previous mega-disasters around the world over the past few years. Careful study of these reports will highlight many of the challenges and complexities most likely to arise and provide useful insights into initiatives which will achieve the greatest degrees of success.

This paper also introduces two diagrams which are useful to practitioners in identifying the key initiatives that will be covered during the emergency response, recovery and risk reduction stages of this particular disaster.


Haiti In Context

Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere with a population of over nine million, two-thirds of which are dependent on the agricultural sector. The capital, Port-au-Prince (see map below), has a population of approximately two million. Before the disaster struck many people had come to this main city as migrants in an attempt to escape the entrenched poverty of many rural areas. The United Nations Development Programme's 2009 Human Development Report (HDR) indicated that Haiti had a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.532 which placed the country 149th out of 182 countries globally. The HDR also indicated that 72% of the population lived on the equivalent of less than USD 2 per person per day.

On 12 January 2010 a major earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter Scale² devastated Port-au-Prince together with a number of other surrounding townships. Casualty figures included at least 150,000 people killed, nearly 200,000 injured, between 800,000 to 1 million people who had lost their homes and who were displaced and up to 2 million people requiring some form of assistance three weeks after the disaster.³ Most deaths in Port-au-Prince and surrounding districts were caused by buildings collapsing which prompted survivors to seek sanctuary back in the countryside with many returning to their home villages.⁴

The immensity of this catastrophe places it firmly in the same category as the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami (228,000 people killed), the 2005 Kashmir Earthquake (88,000 killed), the 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (140,000 killed) and the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake in China (80,000 killed).

Initial response from the international community was one of shock followed by an immediate willingness to provide assistance. While the initial humanitarian response has not been without its difficulties and criticisms by the end of January 2010 over USD 778 million had been received in pledged funding (with a further USD 769 million in uncommitted pledges).⁵ A Ministerial Conference, comprising of 19 Foreign Ministers and International Organisations, took place on 25 January in Montreal, Canada with a general commitment made to support long-term recovery initiatives in Haiti. Participants also agreed to organise a detailed International Donors Conference in March at the United Nations headquarters in New York. By the end of January the Government of Haiti was requesting for a Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) to be carried out in preparation for the New York Conference.



Lessons From Previous Major Disasters

The NGO ALNAP⁶ and the Prevention Consortium prepared a useful joint paper for the humanitarian community following the Sichuan Earthquake China in 2008. Titled 'Responding to Earthquakes. Learning from earthquakes relief and recovery operations'⁷ the paper drew on research from over 30 years of earthquake scenarios. It also included a comprehensive and rich compendium of lessons learned from previous major disasters. One of the most important was the need for stakeholders to rapidly focus the main part of their attention on the longer and relatively more complex recovery stage rather than solely concentrating on emergency response initiatives.

The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami triggered by a massive undersea earthquake off the coast of Sumatra devastated the coastlines of a number of countries particularly Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and Thailand. The tsunami killed approximately 228,000 people and affected a further 1.7 million. The disaster triggered worldwide efforts to raise money with at least USD 13 billion coming from the international community. This money was used, together with host country financial support, to carry out a range of emergency response and recovery initiatives over the following 4-5 years. Much of this work was evaluated in great depth with the most comprehensive studies carried out by the multi-agency and multi-donor supported Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). The initial study, managed by ALNAP, led to a Synthesis Report (later developed into an Expanded Summary of the Synthesis Report) and five thematic joint evaluations.⁸ The purpose of the TEC study was to:

1. Improve the quality of humanitarian action including the links to longer term recovery and development;
2. Provide accountability to the donor public and affected country populations; and
3. Test the TEC approach as a possible model for future joint multi-agency evaluations

Four key recommendations came from the study which revolve around ownership and accountability, capacity, quality and funding. Importantly all recommendations relate to the central idea that the humanitarian aid community should adopt a new paradigm in carrying out its work by "*ceding ownership of the response away*

from themselves and back to the affected population, and thus becoming more accountable to them".⁹ This key sentiment is echoed in a recent paper, 'Towards Good Humanitarian Government: The role of the affected state in disaster response',¹⁰ which endorses the need for the international community to better encourage and support affected host government states and let them take the central role and responsibility in assisting and protecting their citizens in times of disaster.

In addition subsequent improvements in the delivery of humanitarian assistance can be attributed to the TEC study (and other studies). Examples include improved coordination in the field between different sectors which takes place more effectively through the establishment of Clusters. Clusters consist of government, UN and NGO stakeholders involved in particular sectors (e.g. Health and logistics) meeting regularly to share information and facilitate joint planning and initiative coordination. For example since mid January twelve Clusters¹¹ have been operating out of Port-au-Prince with a further six based in the neighbouring Dominican Republic capital Santo Domingo.

A second improvement is the implementation of joint assessments carried out by a consortium of interested and involved key stakeholders. For example, an initial Post Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) was carried out in July 2008, in response to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar/Burma in May 2008, with a more detailed Post-Nargis Recovery & Preparedness Plan (PONREPP) completed towards the end of that year. The PONJA and the PONREPP were both carried out by a Tripartite Core Group which comprised of the Government of the Union of Myanmar, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United Nations with the support of the international humanitarian and development communities.

A third example of improvements made since the Indian Ocean Tsunami, is the establishment of a centralised system for drawing emergency funds. This resulted in the establishment of the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) which has been in operation since 2006. The CERF has so far has earmarked USD 25 million towards humanitarian operations in Haiti.¹²

One of the major success stories of the Indonesian post-tsunami recovery program was the establishment of the Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR). This high level Indonesian-government authority, which commanded a strong local presence on the ground, coordinated many of the recovery initiatives in tsunami-affected Indonesia. The BRR managed around USD 7.0 billion of the Indonesian Tsunami recovery process between April 2005 and April 2009.¹³ This successful program was then handed over to the management of local government authorities and the Indonesian BAPPENAS (National Development Planning Agency). These entities have in turn secured financial backing from the World Bank which totals USD 600 million over the period 2009-2012 in support of 22 projects in five areas.

Other studies that result from the Indian Ocean Tsunami and more recent disasters provide valuable lessons for recovery planners in Haiti. The Aceh Cooperation Assistance Research Project (ACARP),¹⁴ an Indonesian qualitative social research project, identified the key factors that supported or constrained community recovery and redevelopment following the 2004 earthquake and tsunami devastation over a three year period. The project's summary of findings concluded that there are three pivotal determinants to successful community recovery namely governance, livelihoods & livelihood support and housing & infrastructure.

While some humanitarian stakeholders particularly the international community, donor countries, UN agencies and international non-profit organisations (NGOs) have undoubtedly learnt and applied lessons from previous humanitarian situations basic concerns still remain. The main challenge facing these stakeholders is the core thrust of the original TEC recommendations which stated the need to cede more ownership over to the affected population and become more accountable to them. The challenge of this paradigm shift is to seek ways of capacity building local human and other resources on the ground be it communities; host government departments at all levels, local NGOs or other similar organisations.

One way of analysing these humanitarian processes better is through the use of the

Disaster Risk Management Cycle (DRMC) and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) diagrams both of which are introduced in the next section.


The Disaster Risk Management Cycle (DRMC) & Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Diagrams

Two diagrams convey the essence of Disaster Risk Management (DRM), the Disaster Risk Management Cycle (DRMC) and the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) diagram. The DRMC, in particular, clearly illustrates many of core emergency response and recovery initiatives which have been mentioned in this paper so far. The DRR diagram clarifies the key complementary factors which relate to the risk reduction/normal stage of the DRMC.

The DRMC diagram depicts key initiatives which tend to occur in a relatively fast-onset disaster¹⁵ (such as an earthquake) particularly those throughout the Emergency Response and Recovery Stages. Earthquakes are unusual hazards where there is limited or no time given to provide warning or evacuation. In the days immediately following the Haiti earthquake rescue operations included a frantic struggle to seek and free trapped people. Pictures of large numbers of bodies lying uncollected on the streets and the ongoing grief of relatives as they sought out loved ones buried in mass graves highlighted the need to collect and bury the dead in an appropriate and timely manner.

Furthermore, there was a daunting challenge at the outset of clearing logistical routes to deliver much needed humanitarian assistance particularly water, food, emergency shelter and health care to affected people particularly access through the main airport and port at Port-au-Prince.

There was initial justified criticism directed at key aspects of the emergency response management, coordination and information sharing systems but by the end of January efforts had improved through the establishment of a Joint Operations and Tasking Centre (JOTC).¹⁶ The initiative of the Directorate General of the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan Mayor's Association (CIVITAS) is also significant to the improvement of emergency response systems as it invited all national and international humanitarian actors working in Port-au-Prince to a meeting on 31 January at the Tabarre City Hall with the aim of improving emergency assistance coordination.



¹ This mainly applies to a relatively quick-onset disaster (such as Cyclone, Flood, Earthquake, Tsunami, Bushfire etc), rather than a slow-onset one such as Famine (due to Drought/War)
² For details of this see the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) diagram

The DRMC diagram also demonstrates that there is a strong correlation between media attention and the emergency response period; and correspondingly a close relationship between media attention and funding opportunities. The Indian Ocean Tsunami was unique in that six weeks of almost uninterrupted international media attention played a large role in the extraordinarily large sums of international funding raised (in excess of USD 13 billion). Although the scale of media attention and funding in Haiti is not quite comparable to the focus on the Indian Ocean Tsunami the challenges facing planners, particularly in the recovery stage, will be similar. The Montreal Ministerial Conference mentioned a rebuilding program of up to a decade, a timeframe similar to that in Indonesia where the BRR recovery program lasted four years and the post-BRR program programmed for at least a further three more years.

With reference to the Recovery Stage of the DRMC diagram it should be noted that planning should be based on detailed damage and needs assessments. The importance of need assessments were emphasised by the US Secretary of State, Ms Hillary Clinton,¹⁷ in anticipation to the March UN International Donors Conference in New York where detailed financial commitments to the recovery stage will be required. These commitments will largely be based on the findings coming out of the scheduled Haiti Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), which is planned for the latter half of February 2010. This will be a similar exercise to the Myanmar/Burma Post-Cyclone PONJA carried out in July 2008.

Furthermore the restoration of infrastructure services referred to in the DRMC diagram will be immensely challenging for the authorities in the Port-au-Prince. There have already been suggestions that key administrative functions of the capital move to a safer location (similar to Rabaul, Papua New Guinea in 1994 following a volcanic eruption). There also remains a need for targeted ongoing humanitarian assistance over the following months. Assistance is currently focussed on providing food and temporary shelter to large numbers of people as well as dealing with a myriad of health cases. Though this support is targeted to those who have lost their homes and/or livelihoods, are injured or are otherwise among the more vulnerable members

of community. The Gender and Disaster Network (GDN),¹⁸ Handicap International¹⁹ and HelpAge International²⁰ have all produced useful background resources highlighting the need to take special consideration for their own particular constituencies.

The DRMC diagram also highlights three other major components which contribute to the recovery process: supporting community well-being and mental health, the redevelopment of sustainable livelihoods and the repair and reconstruction of homes and other buildings. Each of these sectors is highly complex and will tax the efforts and ingenuity of stakeholders. Various TEC Reports from 2006 to 2009 highlighted two of the sectoral areas which a number of stakeholders, including many international NGOs, found the most challenging.²¹ These areas are the repair and reconstruction of homes and the re-development of sustainable livelihoods.²² The ACARP study similarly highlighted that effective community recovery was premised on housing, livelihoods and good governance.

There are also valuable lessons drawn from other more recent disaster situations which pertain to successful community well-being and mental health recovery. The Victorian State Government's Department of Health commissioned a review of community recovery²³ in the aftermath of the Australian Victorian Bushfires in February 2009 which listed five essential principles in this area: safety, calming, hope, connectedness, self and collective efficacy.²⁴

The final element in the Recovery Stage of the DRMC diagram is Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). DRR is a challenging and complex area and its main elements of this highlighted in the complementary DRR diagram. There are, in effect, five areas which determine effective DRR:


- Security and Good Governance
- Economic and Social Development, with a strong emphasis on Poverty Reduction
- Food and Water Security
- Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change Adaptation
- A range of Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Initiatives

A number of these factors will be pivotal in determining whether the recovery stage of the Haiti earthquake will prove to be a relative success or failure. The first of these relate to security and good governance where it should be noted that Haiti scored extremely poorly on governance in the Transparency International's 2009 Annual Global Corruption Report.²⁵ The issue of entrenched corruption was raised in Montreal and the inevitable enormous flows of imported humanitarian finances and resources will have the potential to seriously exacerbate this already grim situation. There are no simple solutions but a need for balance between the establishment of strong accounting and legal systems to maximise transparency and accountability and the allowance for Haitian authorities to continue to be masters of their own destiny, rather than abrogating responsibility out to an outside international body.

Aceh, a number of foreign armed forces (including those from Singapore, Malaysia, the US and Australia) were invited by the Government of Indonesia to support the Indonesian police and armed forces with re-establishing logistical routes and delivering humanitarian assistance. Despite early concerns about the deployment of non-ASEAN²⁷ military units into Aceh overall coordination worked well with clear exit strategies and virtually all foreign forces had withdrawn from Indonesia within three to five months of their arrival.²⁸ It is hoped that a similar scenario will repeat itself in Haiti.

In recent years, the use of military forces to encroach on 'humanitarian space'²⁹ that is normally occupied by more traditional humanitarian actors such as NGOs has remained a contentious one particularly with regard to deployments into highly politicised and/or insecure regions.³⁰

The lessons from previous humanitarian operations also remain relevant. Large numbers of mainly US foreign troops and police are being deployed (or pledged) to assist the Haitian police and existing United Nations peace-keepers.²⁶ In



Before the earthquake, Haiti faced a challenging range of economic and social development issues, and was struggling to repay its foreign debt.³¹ This already dire situation was exacerbated in prior months by the 2008/9 Global Food Price Crisis³² and the 2008/10 Global Financial Crisis.³³ The Food and Agricultural (FAO)/World Food Program's (WFP) 2009 'State of Food Insecurity in the World Report'³⁴ provides useful insights into the food and water security challenges facing countries such as Haiti.³⁵ Similarly, the International Food Policies Research Institute (IFPRI) 2009 'Global Food Index: The Challenge of Hunger' Report³⁶ highlights the inter-relationship of poverty, health and food security.³⁷

Environmental sustainability, particularly forest protection has been a major challenge facing Haitians for many years. Pressure on preserving depleted forested reserves is likely to become acute in the near future, with increased demand for timber products as part of the re-building and reconstruction process. Such needs may work against efforts to preserve these valuable and important natural resources.

The fifth complementary component of effective DRR is the development of appropriate and effective Disaster Risk Management (DRM) initiatives. In the DRR diagram these are summarised as the following:

- Advocacy, Policy and Legislation
- DRR Funding
- Organisation Structures and Coordination Mechanisms
- Community Risk Assessment and Implementation of both Risk Reduction Initiatives (RRIs) and Poverty Reduction Initiatives (PRIs)
- DR Planning at all levels of Governance
- Capacity Building and Training
- Research/Information Management
- Early Warning Systems and Possible Evacuation
- Public Awareness and Education
- DRM/DRR Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

Two references in the Selected Bibliography highlight progress in DRR globally, particularly to

those related to DRM Initiatives.³⁸ Appropriate authorities in Haiti can also learn from Caribbean neighbours particularly the DRM initiatives currently in Cuba, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.³⁹ All of these countries continually update and improve their systems as a result of dealing with perennial natural disasters, particularly hurricanes. Other wealthier North and South American neighbours, like the US, Canada and Brazil will also be in a position to offer highly useful capacity building resources in this area.

Recommendations

1. The international community would do well to draw down on the lessons learnt from a number of mega-disasters which have taken place over the past few years including the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004), the Kashmir Earthquake (2005), the Myanmar/Burma Cyclone Nargis (2008) and the China Sichuan Earthquake (2008). In particular there are a large number of pertinent lessons which can be learnt from the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) reports, the Myanmar/Burma post-Disaster Assessments and the Indonesian ACARP social study report and the experiences of the Indonesian BRR in handling much of the post-tsunami recovery program in Indonesia.
 2. The Disaster Risk Management Cycle (DRMC) and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) diagrams are useful tools to assist humanitarian practitioners or stakeholders in understanding the key components which tend to take place after a major disaster, particularly as these relate to the Emergency Response, Recovery and Normal/Risk Reduction Stages. The DRMC indicates that the recovery process will probably take years, rather than months. This period will involve:
 - Joint detailed damage and needs assessments
 - The provision of continued humanitarian assistance to targeted vulnerable groups
 - The provision of effective management, coordination and information-sharing
 - The restoration of infrastructure services
 - The repair and reconstruction of homes and other buildings
 - The redevelopment of sustainable livelihood
 - The development of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) initiatives.
 3. A major challenge facing the international community will be that of not taking over the reins of the recovery process, but instead, exploring means of supporting initiatives that are primarily led by Haitians themselves, as represented by local communities, government departments, and local NGOs. It is highly likely that these Haitian stakeholders will request and be offered a large degree of capacity building from the international community.
 4. In order to contribute to 'building back better', a range of complementary Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) initiatives will be required. DRR in practice combines a complementary mix of:
 - Security and Good Governance
 - Economic and Social Development, with a strong emphasis on Poverty Reduction
 - Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change Adaptation
 - Food and Water Security
 - The introduction of an appropriate range of Disaster Risk Management (DRM) initiatives
- Two of these areas will be particularly challenging to effectively enforce namely the ability to create and maintain good governance at all levels and the implementation of effective economic and social development initiatives, which have strong poverty reduction and food security components.

Endnotes

1. Xanano Gusmao, the current Prime Minister of Timor Leste, as quoted by Kirtsy Sword Gusmao, in her 2003 Macmillan publication of "A Woman of Independence".
2. For an explanation on how earthquakes are measured, and geological expert advice on the Haitian earthquake, access the US Geological website at <http://www.usgs.gov>.
3. Figures taken from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of humanitarian affairs (UNOCHA) Situation Reports # 14 (dated 27 Jan 2010), and # 15 (dated 29 Jan 2010), these reports being accessed on www.reliefweb.int.
4. The UN OCHA Report # 15 indicated that by the end of January around 340,000 people had left Port-au-Prince, around a third of these settling in Artibonite Department .
5. These figures were reported by the UN's Financial Tracking Service (FTS) as reported in the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Situation Report Number 15 dated the 29th January 2010.
6. The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action – www.alnap.org.
7. See Selected Bibliography for details.
8. See the Selected Bibliography under ALNAP in the Selected Bibliography at the end of this document.
9. See TEC Synthesis Report: Expanded Summary, comment at bottom of p.4.
10. See the reference to this title by Paul Harvey in the Selected Bibliography.
11. Twelve Clusters are currently operating in the Port-au-Prince (as reported in the OCHA Situation Reports), these relating to Camp Coordination/Management; Education; Emergency Shelter & Non Food Items (NFI); Food; Logistics; Nutrition; Protection; Water, Sanitation & Hygiene (WASH); Agriculture; Early Recovery; Emergency Telecommunications; and Health.
12. Note <http://ochaonline.un.org/Default.aspx?alias=ochaonline.un.org/cerf>.
13. Note the BRR 2007 Annual Report in the Selected Bibliography.
14. <http://www.indo.usaid.gov.au/featurestories/acarpreport.pdf>.
15. In other words earthquakes; tsunamis; cyclones; flooding; landslides; bushfires etc.
16. See UNOCHA Situation Report # 15 dated 29 January 2010.
17. Quoted in the Sydney Morning Herald newspaper, 27th January 2010.
18. 'Gender & Equality in Disasters: Six Principles for Engendered Relief and Recovery'.
19. 'How to include disability issues in disaster management'.
20. ' Older People in Disasters and Humanitarian Crises: Guidelines for Best Practice'.
21. See the Expanded Summary of the Synthesis Report, p15.
22. See again the Expanded Summary of the Synthesis Report, pages 17-18.
23. The Sax Institute's 'Community Recovery after the February 2009 Victorian Bushfires: A Rapid Review'. See Selected Bibliography for details.
24. other words the confidence, power and capacity to get life back together.
25. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), p.402, where Haiti trailed in 177th of 180 countries analysed.
26. There are currently around 8,000 peace-keepers from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which has been established in Haiti since 2004.
27. Association of South East Asian Nations.
28. It is informative to note the useful role of these external military forces in the afore-mentioned Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) reports.

29. Note the article ' Resetting the rules of engagement; trends and issues in military-humanitarian relations' in the Selected Bibliography.
30. The most obvious example being that of military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)' in Afghanistan.
31. Whilst the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) cancelled USD 1.2 billion of foreign debt during 2009, a further USD 900 million still remained at the time of the earthquake.
32. See separate ALNAP publication on this topic.
33. See the latest International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook six-monthly Report.
34. See bibliography for details of this reference.
35. Where, for example, the proportion of the population under-nourished in Haiti rose from 53% in 2000-2, to 58% in 2004-6 (see chart on p. 49).
36. See bibliography for details of this reference.
37. In the data given here (p.13), Haiti is ranked 76th out of 84 developing countries, although its Global Hunger Index (GHI) did improve marginally from 1990 (where it scored 33.6), as compared to 2009 (28.2).
38. These being the 2009 World Disasters Report, and the 2009 UN Report on Global Assessment of DRR
39. See World Disaster Report, 2005 (see bibliography), ch.2, which reviews the various communications systems in place in these countries.

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- ALNAP, 2008, *The Global Food Price Crisis: Lessons & Ideas for Relief Planners & Managers*, <http://www.alnap.org/publications/pdfs/ALNAPLessonsFoodPriceCrisis.pdf>
- ALNAP, 2008, *Responding to Earthquakes 2008. Learning from earthquakes relief and recovery operations*, www.alnap.org/publications/pdfs/ALNAPLessonsEarthquakes.pdf
- ALNAP, 2006/7, *Synthesis Report and Thematic Evaluation Set*, www.alnap.org/initiatives/tec.aspx. This was the major multi-donor Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) evaluation following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, and consisted of a Synthesis Report, and five thematic studies, namely:
- The Role of Needs Assessment in the Tsunami Response
 - Coordination of the International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-affected Countries
 - Impact of the Tsunami response on Local & National Capacities
 - Links between Relief, Rehabilitation & Development in the Tsunami Response
 - Funding the Tsunami Response
- This material was supplemented by a 2007 Expanded Summary of the Synthesis Report, http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/Syn_Report_Sum.pdf and a 2009 Joint Follow-up Evaluation of the Links between Relief, Rehabilitation, & Development (LRRD) - <http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/a-ripple-in-development-main-report.pdf>
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